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pete to collect their loans from a ﬁrm in danger of bankruptcy. We apply a
game-theoreticrealoptions approach toinvestigatebanks’optimalstrate-
gies.Ourmodelrevealsthatthebankwiththelargerloanamount,namely,
the main bank, provides an additional loan to support the deteriorating
ﬁrm when the other bank collects its loan. This suggests that there exists
rational forbearance lending by the main bank. Comparative statics show
that as the liquidation value is lower, the optimal exit timing for the non-
main bank comes at an earlier stage in the business downturn and the
optimal liquidation timing by the main bank is delayed further. As the
interest rate of the loan is lower, the optimal exit timing for the non-main
bank comes earlier. These analyses are consistent with the forbearance
lending and exposure concentration of main banks observed in Japan.
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From the mid-1990s, Japanese banks struggled with the so-called nonperforming-loan
(NPL) problem. The problem emerged partly from the risk embedded in relationship
banking. The disadvantages and advantages of the relationship have been discussed in
the banking theory literature (for details, see Boot [2000] and Elyasiani and Goldberg
[2004]). As is well known, the ﬁrst advantage is a reduction of inefﬁciency stemming
from asymmetric information between a bank and a ﬁrm. The second is an implicit
long-term contract through risk sharing such that a bank maintains a stable loan in-
terest rate even if the ﬁrm’s credit risk ﬂuctuates. These beneﬁts, however, can turn
into disadvantages. For example, monopolistic lending as a consequence of a long-
term relationship between a bank and a ﬁrm gives rise to the hold-up problem, that is,
the bank’s strong bargaining power gives the ﬁrm an incentive to borrow from other
banks. The ﬁrm, therefore, prefers multiple banking relationships despite additional
administrative costs. Another disadvantage is the soft-budget problem, which comes
from an implicit long-term contract. When Japanese banks struggled with the NPL
problem, it was often cited as a typical example of the problem posed by Japanese
banks’ forbearance lending to deteriorating ﬁrms in order to avoid losses from ﬁrms’
bankruptcy. Banks’ arbitrary policies regarding their support for ﬁrms reduced their
discipline for credit risk management.
1
Multiple banking relationships in some countries are combined with a main bank
system. In this system, one particular bank that holds the largest share of a ﬁrm’s debt is
deﬁned as a main bank. The main bank faces the responsibility of monitoring the ﬁrm’s
condition, in return for holding the largest share of lending and providing other ﬁnancial
services to the ﬁrm. Within the main bank system, a soft-budget problem might be more
serious. When the credit condition of the ﬁrm worsens, the non-main bank might collect
its outstanding loans from the ﬁrm. Unless the main bank provides an additional loan
to ﬁll the shortage of the ﬁrm’s loan demand, the main bank immediately suffers from
the ﬁrm’s bankruptcy because of a lack of liquidity. We therefore refer to the main
bank’s additional loan instead of the non-main bank as “debt assumption.” Forbearance
lending, however, might lead to a large loss for the main bank in the future. An arbitrary
lending policy in relationship banking is required for a certain decision rule. As for the
non-main bank, it also faces uncertainty regarding the exit timing from lending to the
ﬁrm. The optimal timing is determined by the trade-off between an increase in credit
risk and an opportunity to gain future earnings from their loan to the ﬁrm. In this paper,
we propose a theoretical model to measure banks’ credit risk in a game between a
main bank and non-main bank concerning their exit timing and their decisions about
the debt assumptions.
1. The soft-budget problem highlightsthedifference between exanteefﬁciency and ex post efﬁciency.In this paper,
ex ante efﬁciency corresponds to the optimal exit strategy without thought for other banks’ lending strategies
as discussed later. The equilibrium of the game with consideration of counterparts’ strategies represents ex post
efﬁciency. Hence, “arbitrary policy,” here, means the main bank’s policy without consideration of the other
banks’ policies.
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First, assuming that a ﬁrm borrows from one bank, we examine the optimal exit
strategy from the lending to the ﬁrm. The strategy can be developed using real options
theory using the stochastic process of ﬁrm value. This approach is developed by Leland
(1994) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). Real options theory pays attention to
the bank’s waiting option to collect its loan from the deteriorating ﬁrm, considering
that the ﬁrm may avoid bankruptcy. It may be optimal for the bank to exit later. The
real options model gives a threshold level of ﬁrm value for the bank’s decision on
exiting under uncertainty of ﬁrm value. Baba (2001) developed a theoretical model to
investigate optimal timing in a bank’s writing off its NPL using a real options approach.
Second, we assume that a ﬁrm borrows from two banks: the main bank and the non-
main bank. This setup introduces a game-theoretic view into the real options model.
We extend the real options model of Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) to a game-
theoretic real options model. This approach is developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
to explain the optimal entry timing in a market in which another player also waits for
his/her optimal entry time. They show that there exists an equilibrium where one of the
potential entrants invests earlier than the other. In addition, the investment timing of
the ﬁrst-mover is earlier than the noncompetitive real options case. Grenadier (1996)
applied this approach to a real estate market to explain “over-building,” a variant of
overinvestment as a barrier to new entrants. Weeds (2002) applied this approach to
ﬁrms’ R&D investment and compared the results of a cooperative game with those of a
noncooperative game. These studies examined the entry game with real options theory,
while our study focuses on the exit game.
Similarly to the entry game, our game-theoretic real options model has a unique
equilibrium. The equilibrium analysis shows that a difference in the loan amount be-
tween the two banks results in a difference in the optimal timing of exit. The main
bank makes debt assumptions in terms of its maximization of the loan value, even if the
non-main bank exits earlier.
Ourmodel doesnot describerational forbearancelending, but doesgive both banks’
measure of their credit risk based on the outlook of the game. In addition, we examine
through comparative statics the impacts of changes in exogenous variables, such as
the liquidation value of the ﬁrm, the interest rate of loan, and the volatility of ﬁrm
value, on both banks’ exit strategies. Each bank determines its optimal exit strategy by
taking into account the other bank’s optimal strategy, and the equilibrium is given in
this game-theoretic situation.
These comparative statics reveal the following.
(1) The lower the liquidation value of the ﬁrm, the earlier the non-main bank exits.
In contrast, the lower the liquidation value, the later the main bank liquidates
the ﬁrm.
(2) The lower the interest rate of the loan, the earlier the non-main bank exits.
(3) The higher the volatility of ﬁrm value, the later both banks exit and liquidate
the ﬁrm. However, much higher volatility causes an incentive to exit for the
non-main bank.
These results are consistent with the forbearance lending and exposure concentra-
tion observed within main banks in Japan.
197The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the bench-
mark model of monopoly lending developed by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997). It
shows how the real options approach helps us determine the optimal timing of exit.
Section III extends the benchmark model to a game in which a ﬁrm borrows from
two banks. Section IV examines the equilibrium of the model described in Section III.
Section V discusses the comparative statics and implications. Section VI concludes.
II. Benchmark Model for Monopoly Lending
First, we examine simple monopoly lending using real options theory, following Mella-
Barral and Perraudin (1997). We explore a model in which a ﬁrm ﬁnances its business
with debt and equity. One bank supplies the loan and a representative equity holder
controls the ﬁrm.
A. Model Settings
We denote the sales of the ﬁrm as
 
￿ and assume that
 
￿ follows a geometric Brownian
























  are constant and z
￿ is a standard Brownian motion process.
We assume constant variables for the following parameters:
 : the operating costs of the ﬁrm,
0: the principal of the bank’s loan,
￿: the liquidation value of the ﬁrm,





,: the risk-free rate, that is, the discount rate under the risk-neutral measure, and
&: the interest rate of the loan.
We assume that the drift of the ﬁrm’s sales
  is less than the risk-free rate
,.
3 We
also assume that the interest rate of the loan
& is greater than
,.
The equity holder and the bank determine their optimal strategies, respectively,
based on their common knowledge of the stochastic process of
 
￿ and the current value
of
 




￿. In the case of bankruptcy, the ﬁrm is owned by the debt
holder, in other words, the bank, and after bankruptcy the bank runs the ﬁrm. The bank’s
choice is either to run the ﬁrm or to liquidate it at each
￿ after the bankruptcy. We
denote the bankruptcy time as
 
￿ and the liquidation time as
 
￿. We also denote F
￿ as
the ﬁltration sets of the information on
 
￿,a n dT
￿ as the set of stopping times on the
information set F
￿. The conditional expectation about F
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Now, we formulate the optimization problem for the equity holder. The equity
holder decides the optimal timing of bankruptcy to maximize the equity value in each











































  equals the maximized present value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts
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After bankruptcy occurs, the bank decides the timing of liquidation to maximize the
loan value under the given value of
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￿ is determined by












































































￿ . The ﬁrst term of
the conditional expectation in equation (3) represents the present value of the interest
incomes
&





￿ ). The second term represents the present
value of the bank’s earnings in the













  during the
￿
periods. The third term represents the present value of the liquidation value of the ﬁrm.
B. Option Values of Bankruptcy and Liquidation
The optimization problem for the equity holder in equation (2) can be solved





































































































The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side of equation (4) is the present value of the
ﬁrm’s earnings before the bankruptcy.
4 This value is an increasing function of the initial
4. The term
￿ is discounted by
￿
￿




￿ is discounted by
￿. This is because
￿
￿ has the drift
  as shown in equation (1).
199Figure 1 Value of Equity and Loan in Monopoly Lending
ﬁrm’s sales
￿ and the drift of the ﬁrm’s sales
 . It is also a decreasing function of
the operating cost
 , the interest rate
,, and the loan amount
0. Note that it does not
depend on the volatility
  in the stochastic process of
 
￿, because the value is derived as
the optimization of the expected value under the risk-neutral measure. The second term
represents the option value of the equity holder owning the right to bankrupt the ﬁrm.




5 This implies that the bankruptcy option becomes more
valuable as the ﬁrm’s sales become more volatile.













￿ in equation (4) is the probability
that
￿ reaches the threshold value
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￿. The equity value function is
depicted in Figure 1.




























































































































































 . See Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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The bankruptcy option increases the equity value, which implies that it, in turn,
decreases the value of loan for the bank. Once the optimal timing of the bankruptcy is
given by the time when
￿ reaches the threshold value
￿





  and the threshold value of




































































































The derivations of these are shown in Appendix 2.
Equation (6) is interpreted as follows. The ﬁrst term represents the present value of
the interest incomes, and the second term is the negative option value resulting from


























  is close to the ﬁrst












  represents the loan value after bankruptcy,
g i v e nb y( 7 ) .
Equation (7) shows the present value of the ﬁrm that the bank inherits from the
equity holder at the time
 
￿
￿ . The ﬁrst and second terms represent the value to the bank
of running the ﬁrm after the bankruptcy. The bank obtains the total proﬁt of the ﬁrm,
while the equity holder obtains the ﬁrm’s proﬁt after interest payments, as shown in
equation (4). The third term is the option value of the bank having the right to postpone
the liquidation of the ﬁrm in order to bet on the ﬁrm’s recovery. The option value is







￿ and the loss (or proﬁt) at liquida-













  is an increasing function of





￿, the threshold value of the liquidation given by








￿ is assumed in the maximization of
equation (3) to obtain equations (6), (7), and (8), which are required for the optimality
of the liquidation threshold
￿
￿.
Figure 1 shows the value functions of the equity and the loan that correspond to
equations (2) and (3). The optimal timings of the bankruptcy and the liquidation are
given by the points where the value function curves are smoothly pasting to zero and
￿, respectively.
7 The loan value curve has an upper bound given by the present value
of interest incomes. The bound corresponds to the value in the case of
￿
￿
￿,t h a ti s ,
bankruptcy probability
￿
￿. As long as
￿ is less than
0,i no t h e rw o r d s ,
￿ is less than
a unit, the equity holder accepts bankruptcy earlier than the bank accepts liquidation.
7. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
201III. Extended Model for Duopoly Lending
In this section, we extend the benchmark model to the case where a ﬁrm borrows from
two banks. In the previous section, one bank provided a loan to the ﬁrm and the bank’s
collecting the loan meant that the ﬁrm is liquidated by the bank. In the duopoly lending
case,theequityholderrunstheﬁrmaslongasthetotalamountoftheloanismaintained.
In the duopoly case, the optimal bankruptcy timing is earlier than when banks collect
their loans in the monopoly case. We therefore investigate an exit game between two
banks where one of the banks might make a debt assumption when the other bank
collects its loan. The decision of the debt assumption depends on the optimization
problem for the bank that faces the ﬁrst action by the other bank. In this section, we
examine the optimization problem for the ﬁrst-mover, and for the other, assigning a
bank to the role of either the ﬁrst-mover or the other.
A. Model Settings
Neither bank determines its strategy cooperatively. We have two banks: bank A and
bank B. Bank










￿) and thus we refer to
￿ as
the “leader” and
1 as the “follower.” The model in this section yields the optimal
strategy given the counterpart’s strategy, preparing for the noncooperative game in the
next section.
All parameters except the loan amount are the same for banks A and B, and de-
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￿), then the follower bank
1 might make a debt assumption of
0
￿,t h e
amount of the loan that the leader bank
￿ collects from the ﬁrm. When the follower
bank
1 liquidates the ﬁrm after the debt assumption, bank
1 obtains the liquidation
value
￿,w h e r e
￿
 
0. We do not assume that bank A or B becomes the leader at






The optimization problem for the equity holder is the same as in Section II.
Furthermore, the optimal bankruptcy timing
 
￿
￿ is given as in Section II.
Given the bankruptcy timing
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￿ is the exit timing for the leader
bank
￿. The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side in equation (9) represents the present value





￿ ). The second term
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represents the present value of the leader’s earnings in the periods from the bankruptcy









8 Because we assume that both banks maintain their exiting loan
shares after the bankruptcy, the second term is composed of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt divided by
its lending share after the bankruptcy. The third term represents the present value of










￿ is derived from the
optimization in equation (9).
The follower bank determines
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￿ , the optimal timing of the liquidation after it
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￿. We exclude the possibility of simultaneous exits of both banks, because
the continuous
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The ﬁrst term in equation (10) represents the present value of the follower’s interest





￿ ). The second term represents the present value








￿). The third term repre-
















B. Valuation for Each Loan Value

























































































































See Appendix 3 for the derivation.













  and the second term is not needed.
203Equation (11) represents the leader’s loan value before the bankruptcy. The ﬁrst
term represents the present value of the interest incomes, and the second term corre-
sponds to the negative option value stemming from the equity holder’s execution of
the bankruptcy option. These formulas are similar to those in the benchmark model
















the benchmark model (7). The second term represents the positive option value of the
leader being able to exit earlier than the follower.
Thepositive option value isdetermined by(1) theprobability thattheleader collects
its loan at







￿, and (2) the loan principal minus the loan value




￿. The latter represents
the leader’s net gain when the leader collects its loan at
￿. The multiple of the gain and
the exit probability yields the option value of early exit from lending.
Note that the threshold value of the leader’s exit shown in equation (13) is in-
dependent of its loan amount. This is because the leader determines the exit timing
by the gap between the total loan amount





second term of the equation (12) operates only as a multiplier.



















  is equal to its loan principal,
￿
￿
0. We assume that the loan value pastes


















￿ in (5) is larger than the leader’s exit threshold
￿
￿ in
(13), because we assume the loan interest rate
& is greater than the risk-free rate
,.T h e
leader, therefore, always exits after the bankruptcy.
Figure 2 depicts the leader’s loan value function given by equation (11), normal-
izing the value by its loan principal. The value is always larger than a unit from the
assumption that the leader can collect the loan principal at the exit by the follower’s
debt assumption. The value pastes smoothly to the normalized loan principal value, that
is, a unit. As the ﬁrm’s sales
￿ increase, the probability of bankruptcy in equation (11)
decreases and the lower probability reduces the negative option value in absolute terms,
which increases the loan value. The loan value converges to the present value of the




The leader’s loan value is larger than the loan value of the monopoly lending be-
cause the leader holds the option to exit earlier, which the monopoly bank does not. As
shown in Figure 2, a decline of











  in the monopoly case.
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Figure 2 Value of the Leader’s Loan






 . The maximal value is obtained
given bankruptcy threshold
￿





















































































































































See Appendix 3 for the derivation.
The follower’s loan value in equation (14) is similar to the leader’s value in equa-











  corresponding to the follower’s loan value
205Figure 3 Value of the Follower’s Loan











  in equation (15) is the “negative”













  is deﬁned by equation (16). The ﬁrst term of equation (16) is the
present value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts minus the leader’s loan principal, which is identical
to the amount of the debt assumption for the follower. The second term is the option
value for the follower of liquidating the ﬁrm. The gap between the liquidation value
￿




￿ represents the gain from the














￿ holds by the assumption
￿
 
0. This implies that the op-
timal liquidation timing is later than the leader’s exit. It is rational for the follower to
make the debt assumption in this model and to run the ﬁrm by itself until
￿ reaches
￿




0 and it thus has the incentive to make a debt assumption to wait for
the ﬁrm’s recovery.
Figure 3 depicts thefollower’s loan value function witha solid bold line. It isalways
less than the monopoly loan value because of the “negative” option value. Naturally,
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￿ before the debt assumption. The latter is greater than the former from the
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banks A and B both want to avoid being the follower. In the next section, we investigate
the equilibrium in the game between the two banks.
IV. The Equilibrium
In this section, we examine the equilibrium of the model described in Section III. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that bank A has a larger loan than bank B. We regard
bank A as the “main bank” and bank B as the “non-main bank.” The only difference
between the main and non-main bank is the loan amount.
First, we examine the follower’s loan value assuming each bank is in the position













 , and with a











follower’s value for the non-main bank is less than that for the main bank, because the
burden of the debt assumption on the non-main bank is larger than that on the main
bank in the case that the ﬁrm is ﬁnally liquidated. The larger
￿
￿
0 is in equation (16),
the larger the negative option value in equation (15) is in absolute value. The larger
negative option value for the non-main bank makes the follower’s value curve for the
bank lower than that for the main bank.
















  curve and the
Figure 4 The Equilibrium
207principal, both normalized by
0
￿, gives the threshold value of
￿ for the optimal exit
timing for the non-main bank. However,
￿
￿
￿ is not an optimal threshold in the equi-














bank deduces that the main bank does not exit earlier and it is optimal to continue the
















banks have an incentive to maintain their lending. If the non-main bank exits at that
point, it is optimal for the main bank to continue lending by making a debt assumption,
because the liquidation value corresponding to
￿
￿ in Figure 4 is the new comparative
value for the main bank to decide its strategy either to run the ﬁrm or to liquidate it. The











￿ , the non-main bank collects its loan and the main bank makes a



















V. Comparative Statics and Implications
In this section, we consider how exogenous conditions affect the (non-)main bank exit
strategy. We change the ﬁrm’s exogenous parameters such as (1) the liquidation value
of the ﬁrm, (2) the interest rate of the loan, and (3) the volatility of the ﬁrm’s sales.
The benchmark parameters are given in Table 1.
A. Comparative Statics on the Firm’s Liquidation Value
First, we examine how the banks’ exit strategies vary with the liquidation value. In
Figure 5, the vertical axis shows the recovery rate of the loan principal at the liquidation
instead of the liquidation value, and the horizontal axis represents the current ﬁrm’s
sales








￿, are shown for the case of the benchmark. The main
results are as follows.
(1) The exit threshold for the non-main bank
￿
￿ increases as the recovery rate
￿
decreases. This implies that the non-main bank tends to exit earlier when the
recovery rate is lower.
11
Table 1 Benchmark Parameters
Drift of the process
￿
￿:





￿ 0.5–1.5 Operating cost:
￿ 1
Interest rate
￿ 5 percent Risk-free rate
￿ 2 percent
Principal















￿ , the non-main bank is indifferent between
exiting and continuing operations.
11. In the game-theoretic situation, the non-main bank determines the exit strategy comparing the follower’s value
with the loan principal (the value of exiting as a leader) and thus the follower’s value plays an important role,
whereas the non-main bank always exits as a leader at the equilibrium.
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Figure 5 Banks’ Exit Strategies and the Firm’s Liquidation Value
(2) The liquidation threshold for the main bank
￿
￿ decreases as the recovery rate
￿
decreases. This implies that the main bank tends to hesitate regarding liquida-
tion when the liquidation value decreases. Because the option value of delaying
liquidating the ﬁrm is higher for the lower recovery rate, it is rational for the
main bank to wait for the recovery of the ﬁrm’s sales
￿.
(3) The bankruptcy threshold
￿
￿ for the equity holder is independent of the liquida-
tion value. Because the liquidation value
￿ does not exceed the loan amount
0,
this condition provides the equity holder with less incentive to bet on the sales
recovery than the main bank, discussed in Section II.
In Figure 5, we can also observe that the bankruptcy threshold might be larger than
the non-main bank’s exit threshold at a high recovery rate, such asmore than 80 percent.
In this case, both of the banks continue lending after the bankruptcy.
B. Comparative Statics on the Interest Rate
Next, we examine how the banks’ exit strategies vary with the interest rate
&.T h em a i n
results shown in Figure 6 are as follows.
(1) The exit threshold of the non-main bank
￿
￿ increases as the loan interest rate de-
creases. The bank tends to exit earlier when the loan rate is lower. The lower the
incomes from the loan, the lower the value of both banks’ loan.
12 The liquidation
12. The declines in the loan values hasten the non-main bank to collect its loan, while the timing of liquidation by
the main bank does not change. Once the main bank makes its debt assumption, all proﬁts belong to the main
bank and therefore the threshold
￿
￿ is independent of the lending rate.
209Figure 6 Banks’ Exit Strategies and the Loan Interest Rate
threshold
￿
￿ is independent of the interest rate
& (the
￿
￿ curve is a vertical line
in Figure 6). This is because the ﬁrm’s proﬁt belongs to the banks after the
bankruptcy and the decision of the liquidation is independent of the interest rate.
(2) The bankruptcy threshold
￿
￿ increases as the loan rate increases. The equity
holder of the ﬁrm tends to bankrupt the ﬁrm earlier, because the higher interest
payment decreases the equity value. For loan rates of more than 6 percent in
Figure 6, the bankruptcy occurs before the non-main bank’s exit. For this reason,
the non-main bank’s exit threshold
￿
￿ is independent of the loan rate
&,t h a ti s ,
the
￿
￿ curve is vertical. Because the proﬁts of the ﬁrms are shared by both banks
in proportion to their loan amount, the loan rate does not matter.
These results suggest that low loan rates tend to increase the loan exposure concen-
tration to the main bank and provide a strong incentive for the equity holder to lower
the ﬁrm’s sales
￿.
C. Comparative Statics on the Volatility of Firm Sales
Finally, we examine how the banks’ exit strategies vary with the volatility of the ﬁrm’s
sales
 . The main results shown in Figure 7 are as follows.
(1) The non-main bank tends to exit later as sales volatility increases, because the
option value to bet on the recovery increases. However, in the case of higher
volatility such as that greater than 25 percent, the exit threshold
￿
￿ bends
backward. We provide reasons for this below.
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Figure 7 Banks’ Exit Strategies and the Volatility of the Firm’s Sales
(2) As the volatility increases, the equity holder tends to reduce ﬁrm sales. This
is a similar incentive to the main bank, which has an incentive to delay the
liquidation of the ﬁrm. This is because the waiting option value to bankrupt
and liquidate the ﬁrm increases as the volatility increases.
In the standard real options model, the optimal threshold is a monotonically in-
creasing function of sales volatility as shown by the bankruptcy curve in Figure 7. On
the other hand, in the game-theoretic real options model, the optimal threshold is not
always a monotonically increasing function of sales volatility, as shown in Kijima and
Shibata (2005). The reason is as follows.
Note that the follower’s value plays an important role in determining the exit strat-
egy. As explained in (15)–(17), the follower’s value is composed of the two negative
option values and one positive option value as follows:
The follower’s option value
￿ negative option value suffering from the equity’s option to bankrupt the ﬁrm
￿ negative option value suffering from the leader bank’s option to exit early
￿ positive option value generated by the follower bank’s option to liquidate
the ﬁrm.
211The relative sizes of the positive and negative option values make the exit threshold
curve backward bending. The increase in the volatility heightens all three option values
for the main bank, in other words, the follower, on an absolute value basis. For lower
volatility, the increase in the positive option value exceeds the increase in the negative
one, which makes the exit threshold for the follower lower. This, in turn, lowers the
optimal exit threshold for the leader. For higher volatility, in contrast, the increase in
the positive option value is less than the increase in the negative one. The exit threshold,
therefore, rises as the volatility increases.
VI. Conclusion
This paper developed a dynamic model for credit risk in relationship lending. It con-
sidered the case in which the main bank and the non-main bank play a game of exit
from their deteriorating lending, and examined their optimal exit strategies by applying
a game-theoretic real options approach.
Our model showed that each bank determines the optimal exit strategy by taking
into account the other bank’s optimal strategy and that the equilibrium of the game de-
pends on the difference in the loan amount between the two banks. The main bank with
a larger loan amount makes a debt assumption rationally in a sense of its maximization
of the loan value.
The paper also used comparative statics to examine the effect of exogenous vari-
ables, such as the liquidation value of the ﬁrm and the loan interest rate, on the banks’
strategies. First, a low liquidation value makes the non-main bank exit earlier, whereas
it enhances the main bank’s incentive to delay the liquidation while waiting for the
ﬁrm’s recovery. Second, a low loan rate leads to the early exit of the non-main bank.
These mechanisms accelerate the concentration of the main bank’s exposure to the
deteriorating ﬁrm.
Finally, we illustrated how our model can be further developed. First, it would be
interesting to investigate asymmetric information about the ﬁrm between the two banks.
Themainbanksmayhavedifferentinformation on thestochasticprocessofinitialsales,
￿. Second, it is possible for the main bank to revitalize the ﬁrm once the bank owns the
ﬁrm. The bank may reduce the ﬁrm’s operating cost and improve the growth rate of the
ﬁrm’s sales. It would be interesting to investigate these extensions to our model.
APPENDIX 1: THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FOR THE
EQUITY HOLDER
In this appendix, we show the solution of the optimization problem for the equity holder
















































  represents the value of the ﬁrm for the equity holder. Applying Ito’s

























































































  converges to the present value of the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts as





  pastes smoothly to zero at
￿
￿. These conditions are called
the “value matching condition” and “smooth pasting condition,” respectively.
Equation (A.2) is an Euler differential equation and can be solved analytically with
































































































































APPENDIX 2: THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FOR THE
MONOPOLY BANK
This appendix shows the solution of the optimization problem for the bank in the
case of monopoly lending, given the bankruptcy threshold
￿
￿ derived in Appendix 1.



















































































  represents the value of loan for the monopolist bank. Applying Ito’s




















































































































































Equations (A.7) and (A.9) are Euler differential equations and can be solved
analytically.Equation(A.9)issolvedﬁrst,andthesolutionisappliedforequation(A.7).
The value of the loan and liquidation threshold
￿
￿ are derived by the boundary


















































































































APPENDIX 3: THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FOR THE
LEADER BANK
This appendix shows the solution of the optimization problem for the leader bank in the


































































































  represents the value of loan for the leader bank. Applying Ito’s lemma




























































































































































































Equations (A.14) and (A.16) can be solved analytically, and the value of the loan
and the exit threshold for leader
￿




































































































































215APPENDIX 4: THE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM FOR THE
FOLLOWER BANK
This appendix shows the solution of the optimization problem for the follower bank.


























































































































































  represents the value of loan for the follower bank. Applying Ito’s lemma
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The above equations can be solved backward analytically from (A.25) to (A.23)
and then to (A.21). The liquidation threshold for follower
￿
￿ is derived by the boundary
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